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I.

Introduction

In 2015, distinguished corporate ethicist Thomas Fox asserted that the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”), one of the regulatory bodies charged with enforcing the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (“FCPA”), was beginning to hold companies liable for violations of the Act’s accounting provisions
based on strict liability.1 Since then, it has become the explicit policy of the SEC to hold domestic issuers
strictly liable for FCPA accounting provisions violations under its civil disgorgement remedy.2 However,
the SEC has taken the policy a step further, bringing actions against parent companies based on strict
liability for violations of the accounting provisions committed by their subsidiaries. 3 Generally, the
underlying reasoning for this theory of liability is that the parent should be held liable for the violations
its subsidiary commits when they are acting within the parent’s control.4 Based on this reasoning, it is
the SEC’s policy to hold parent companies of majority owned subsidiaries strictly liable for their
violations based on the assumption that they are able to exercise a significant level of control over
subsidiaries in which they own more than 50% of the stock. 5 However, if a parent company owns less
than a 50% share of a subsidiaries’ stock, they are only required to “use good faith efforts to cause the
minority-owned subsidy . . . [to] maintain a system of internal accounting controls consistent with the
issuer’s own obligations under the FCPA.” 6

1

Thomas Fox, Are FCPA Books and Records and Internal Controls Defenses Becoming Obsolute?, THE FCPA
BLOG: A T LARGE (Mar. 9, 2015) https://fcpablog.com/2015/3/9/are-fcpa-books-and-records-and-internal-controlsdefenses-be/,
2 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE CRIMINAL DIVISON & SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM’N. ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, A RESOURCE GUIDE
TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES A CT at 43-44(2d ed. 2020) [hereinafter FCPA Resource Guide]; Olesya
Sidorkina, Establishing Corporate Parent Liability for FCPA Violations, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 89, 99-100 (2013).
3 See infra.
4 Sidorkina, supra note 2, at 99-100.
5 FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 2, at 44.
6 Id.
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There is a strong justification for this policy; “a parent corporation cannot immunize itself from
FCPA’s accounting violations by organizing in several tiers.” 7 However, holding parent companies strictly
liable for those violations whenever they own a majority share of subsidiaries that committed the
violations directly contradicts the common law theory of agency liability. 8 Basing strict liability for
accounting violations on an assumed agency relationship is problematic because it does not take into
account factual circumstances that may contradict the assumption that these subsidiaries are truly
acting under the control of their parent companies. 9 The result is that a parent company can be held
liable under the accounting provisions for the acts of a rogue employee that works for a majority -owned
subsidiary even if they were violating the rules of the subsidiary and the parent company’s mandates for
that subsidiary. Parent companies are often held liable for the actions of subsidiaries regardless of a
lack of knowledge or any good-faith action on the part of the parent company. 10
The problems for those tasked with ensuring compliance with the FCPA created by this
encompassing theory of respondeat superior are profound in the context of an acquisition. Acquisitions
present an added difficulty because information is often insufficient for professionals to adequately
measure the compliance risk prior to acquiring an entity and the widely accepted assumption it takes
time to change the internal procedures of a subsidiary post-acquisition.11 The theory behind holding
parent companies strictly liable for the acts of majority-owned subsidiaries relies heavily on the
assumption that having majority voting power equates to asserting control over a subsidiary ’s daily

7

Sidorkina supra note 2, at 100.
See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 14M (1958) (“A corporation does not become an agent of another
corporation merely because a majority of its voting shares is held by the other.”)Bas
9 Richard Cassin, Are Agents Ever ‘Legal’ Under the FCPA?, THE FCPA BLOG: A T LARGE (Aug. 6, 2020),
https://fcpablog.com/2020/08/06/at-large-are-agents-ever-legal-under-the-fcpa/
10 Id.
11 FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 2, at 29. See Daniel Grimm, Traversing The Minefield: Joint Ventures and
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 91, 127-133 (2014)[hereinafter Grimm, Traversing the
Minefield]; Daniel Grimm, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in Merger and Acquisition Transactions: Successor
Liability and Its Consequences, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 247,292-3 (2010)[hereinafter Grimm, Successor Liability and its
Consequences].
8
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operations.12 When strict liability for the acts of subsidiaries is based on the assumption that voting
power amounts to agency, the effects on the process of conducting an acquisition are potentially farreaching.13
The potential problems that the SEC’s theory of strict liability under the accounting provisions
for the violations of subsidiaries creates in the context of an acquisition are illustrated in its enforcement
action against Novartis AG (“Novartis”). In June 2020, the SEC brought an enforcement action against
Novartis for violations of both the Books and Records, and Internal Controls provisions (“Accounting
provisions”) of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 14 The actions of Alcon Pte. Ltd. were among these
violations and the SEC ordered Novartis to pay $8.4 Million in disgorgement resulting from Alcon’s
improper conduct in Vietnam. 15 This action was part of a broader investigation into FCPA violations
committed by Novartis, Alcon Inc.(“Alcon”), and several of their subsidiaries, conducted by the SEC and
the Department of Justice (“DOJ”).16 Novartis acquired Alcon in 2011, while multiple Alcon subsidiaries
were in the midst of local bribery schemes in foreign countries that had continuously occurred since
2007, including the Vietnam branch of Alcon Pte. Ltd.17 Novartis was subsequently held liable for these
violations as they were committed by the Alcon subsidiaries immediately after the acquisition was
complete.18 The SEC found that Novartis committed substantive violations the accounting provisions of

12

FCPA Resource guide, supra note 2, at 44; see, e.g., Philip Urofsky, The Ralph Lauren FCPA Case: Are There
Any Limits to Parent Corporation Liability?, Bloomberg BNA: Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 1 (May 6, 2013),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-ralph-lauren-fcpa-case-are-there-an-06860
13 Martin Weinstein, The World of International Compliance: What Transactional Lawyers Need to Know to
Perform Ethically and Responsibly, 29 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 311, 322, 325-326 (2007); Preston Eldridge, Without Bounds:
Navigating Corporate Compliance Through Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 66 A RK. L. REV. 733,
754 (2013).
14 Novartis AG., Exchange Act Release No. 89149, 2020 SEC Lexis 2677, 2 -3 (Jun. 25, 2020) (Order Instituting
Cease-And-Desist Proceedings)[hereinafter Cease-And-Desist Order].
15 Id. at 14-15.
16 D.O.J., 2020. Novartis AG and Subsidiaries to Pay $345 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Cases. [online] Available at: <https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/novartis-ag-and-subsidiaries-pay-345-millionresolve-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-cases> [Accessed 16 April 2021]; S.E.C., 2020. SEC Charges Novartis AG
with FCPA Violations.
17 Cease-And-Desist Order, supra note 14, at 2-3.
18 Id.
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the FCPA as a result of the conduct of Alcon. Pte Ltd. in Vietnam without any allegation that any Novartis
executive or employee participated in or had any knowledge of the activities conducted in Vietnam. 19
Additionally, the SEC did not allege that Novartis failed to make good faith efforts to cause the Alcon
subsidiaries to comply with their internal accounting controls or accurately record the transactions. 20
Instead, the SEC based its theory of liability on the finding that Novartis failed to prevent the Alcon
subsidiary in Vietnam from continuing to engage in paying bribes to public officials through a third-party
distributor following the merger with Alcon. 21
In this comment, I will examine the impact that strict liability for violations of the FCPA’s
accounting provisions has on companies before and after executing an acquisition, and make the
argument for requiring good faith efforts to cause subsidiaries to comply in lieu of strict liability for the
period of time it takes to reasonably integrate compliance measures within the subsidiary postacquisition. Section II of this comment will provide an overview of the FCPA and its enforcement, in
addition the theory of liability relied on by the enforcement agencies to hold parent companies liable for
the actions of their subsidiaries. In section III, the comment will examine the SEC enforcement action
against Novartis AG for the actions of Alcon Pte. Ltd. and the implications of strict liability under the
accounting provisions for the task of conducting the transaction and the process of implementing
compliance programs post-merger. Section IV will advocate for a good faith efforts standard to replace
strict liability under the accounting provisions for parents of wholly owned subsidiaries that were
recently acquired, and provide a framework for applying this standard.
II. Overview of the FCPA and Agency Enforcement
This section will begin by providing an overview of the purpose and background underlying the
FCPA’s enactment and subsequent amendments. It will then give a brief introduction to the bribery and

19

Id. at 12-15.
Id.
21 Id. at 14.
20
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accounting provisions, the nature of its enforcement, and applicable scope of liability for subsidiary
violations of the FCPA.
a. legislative history of the FCPA
The original Act was passed in December 1977 after a pervasive culture of bribery among American
companies that operated in international markets was revealed in the course of the investigations
following the Watergate scandal. 22 The SEC investigation, commenced after information was revealed by
the Watergate Special Prosecutor, resulted in over 400 American companies voluntarily disclosing that
they paid a bribe to foreign officials at some point. 23 The goal of the FCPA’s original passage was to curb
the negative effects that bribery had on international business and foreign policy relations.24 It did this
by flatly outlawing bribes of foreign officials, while requiring certain companies to ensure that generally
accepted accounting standards be met in order to foster transparency in corporate disclosures. 25
There were three broad justifications for the act that were characterized as ethical, business, and
policy-based arguments. 26 The ethical argument was advocated by many in response to the Watergate
scandal who thought that corporate bribery in foreign countries was not in line with the “moral
expectations and values of the American public.” 27 The act was also had a business justification in that a
culture of pervasive bribery in foreign markets was claimed to hurt American business interests in the
long run by increasing expenses, and inhibiting innovation and advancement. 28 Additionally, it was
found that the global pervasiveness of bribery frustrated the foreign policy objectives of the United
States by creating political and economic instability and animus within foreign countries towards
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FCPA Resource guide, supra note 2, at 2.
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES A CT: COMPLIANCE, INVESTIGATIONS A ND ENFORCEMENT § 1.03, ALM Media Properties
LLC (2020 Ed.)
24 FCPA Resource Guide supra note 2, at 2.
25 Id. at 2-3.
26 Id.
27 Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, 95 th Cong., 1 st Sess., 4 (Sept. 28,1977)).
28 Id.
23
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“American ideals and interests.”29 At the time, the anti-bribery movement was politically popular and
had broad bi-partisan support. 30
Since its enactment, extensive changes have been made to the Act that have dramatically expanded
its scope and impact. Between 1980 and 1988, dissatisfaction with the Act grew and several proposals
were offered, culminating in the 1988 amendments.31 The primary objection to the FCPA at this time
was that the Act was vague and confusing, causing an increase in compliance costs. 32 First, affirmative
defenses were added and language was incorporated from the domestic bribery standard to help clarify
the conduct that the Act was prohibiting. 33 Additionally, the 1988 Amendments included a mandate for
the president to encourage members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation to adopt antibribery measures, resulting in the Anti-Bribery Convention. 34 In 1998, following the ratification of the
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign in International Business Transactions, Congress
crafted amendments to the FCPA that brought them in compliance with the convention’s terms. 35 The
term ‘improper benefit’ was expanded to include anything that was considered an “improper
advantage.”36 Additionally, the applicable scope of Act was expanded to reach more foreign actors. 37
b. The anti-bribery and accounting provisions
Generally, the Anti-Bribery Provisions of the FCPA prohibit certain categories of entities from
conferring or promising to confer anything of value to public officials of a foreign country in exchange
for an unlawful influence of their official actions to secure an improper advantage. 38 There are multiple
elements that must be established by the enforcement agencies in order to hold an entity criminally

29

Id.
Id.
31 THE FOREIGN CORRUPT P RACTICES A CT: COMPLIANCE, INVESTIGATIONS A ND ENFORCEMENT § 1.03.
32 Id.
33 Id. See also FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 2, at 2.
34 FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 2, at 2.
35 THE FOREIGN CORRUPT P RACTICES A CT: COMPLIANCE, INVESTIGATIONS A ND ENFORCEMENT § 1.03.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 FCPA Resource Guide supra note 2, at 9.
30
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liable under this provision. They must establish that the entity; (1) made a payment or offer to make a
payment of something of value, (2) to a public official of another country, (3) corruptly for the purpose
of influencing an official act or securing an improper advantage, (4) in order to assist the entity in
obtaining or retaining business. 39
Whether a particular offering or gift constitutes “anything of value” seemingly depends on the
“subjective perception of the intended recipient.” 40 This element is interpreted broadly to include things
such as small payments and gifts, charitable donations, travel and leisure expenses, political
contributions, and even professional training seminars. 41 The term “Public Official” is also interpreted
broadly to include any employee of a foreign governmental entity or any person acting in their official
capacity on behalf of any governmental agency or instrumentality. 42 The DOJ has gone as far as
considering an employee of a private company a public official because their employer was granted a
license to operate as an instrumentality of the government. 43 Often, the SEC considers doctors in public
and semi-public hospitals to be public officials. 44
The inquiry into whether a particular payment was made in violation of the FCPA primarily depends
on whether that payment was made unlawfully. 45 To constitute an unlawful or corrupt payment, the
payment must be made with “an intent or desire to wrongfully influence the recipient.” 46 The
government is required to allege that the payment was made with the specific intent to facilitate an
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THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES A CT: COMPLIANCE, INVESTIGATIONS A ND ENFORCEMENT § 2.01, ALM Media Properties
LLC (2020 Ed.)
40 THE FOREIGN CORRUPT P RACTICES A CT: COMPLIANCE, INVESTIGATIONS A ND ENFORCEMENT § 2.04.
41 FCPA Resource Guide supra note 2, at 15-16; THE FOREIGN CORRUPT P RACTICES A CT: COMPLIANCE, INVESTIGATIONS
A ND ENFORCEMENT § 2.04.
42 FCPA Resource Guide supra note 5, at 19; see e.g., United States v. Carson, No. 09-00077, 2011 LEXIS 88853
at *31 (C.D.C.A. May 18, 2011) (finding that instrumentalities includes state -owned companies).
43 United States v. SBM Offshore N.V., No. 17-CR-00686, Information ¶¶ 17-18 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2017)
(alleging that employees of a subsidiary of an Italian oil company were public officials when awarding contracts in
its capacity as the operator of an oil field, which was granted by government concession).
44 FCPA Resource Guide supra note 5, at 19.
45 Id. at 13. (“By focusing on intent, the FCPA does not require that a corrupt act succeed in its purpose.”)
46 Id.
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exchange for influencing an official act. 47 The government must also show that the exchange resulted in
the defendant obtaining some kind of improper advantage in obtaining or retaining business. 48 In
United States v. Kay, the Fifth Circuit Court ruled that the government agencies are only required to
conclusory factual allegations to establish a link between the benefit received as a result of the
payment and the assistance in obtaining or retaining business. 49 The Court’s underlying reasoning was
that the law was intended to prevent the inducement of government officials “to perform an official
duty in a corrupt manner[,]” and therefore, there is no requirement to provide detailed factual
allegations about how this benefit resulted in a competitive advantage. 50
The entity accused of paying a bribe must simply have knowledge that the act is generally
unlawful and intend specifically for the payment to be in exchange for influencing official act.51 The term
“official act” is interpreted to encompass payments made in exchange for influencing any act in violation
of a lawful duty or decision made by a public official. 52 It also includes payments made for the purpose
of causing a public official to use their position to impact any act or decision of a government agency or
instrumentality.53 In 1998, a catchall was added that de-emphasized the “business nexus” requirement
by prohibiting any payment made to an official for the purpose of “securing any improper advantage.” 54
There are two affirmative defenses to a charge of violating the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.
There is an exception for facilitating or expediting payments and an entity accused of making an
improper payment may claim the payment was lawful under the written laws of the foreign country. 55

47

Id.
Id.
49 359 F.3d 738, 761 (5 th Cir. 2004).
50 Id.
51 FCPA Resource Guide supra note 2, at 15-16; THE FOREIGN CORRUPT P RACTICES A CT: COMPLIANCE, INVESTIGATIONS
A ND ENFORCEMENT § 2.06.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 FCPA Resource Guide supra note 2, at 23-25.
48
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However, these defenses are applied narrowly and litigants have been overwhelmingly unsuccessful in
pleading them at the trial court level. 56
The accounting provisions of the FCPA are applicable to public companies and “operate in
tandem with the anti-bribery provisions.”57 The accounting provisions have a very broad scope and give
the government significant power to regulate the financial management and reporting practices within
publicly traded corporations in the United States. 58 In addition to a pervasive culture of corporate
bribery, the reports and hearings leading to the FCPA’s enactment revealed that there was also a
pervasive culture of hiding these payments through an “extensive web of ‘unrecorded slush funds[.]’” 59
This created a lack of public trust for the overall integrity in the financial reporting system that Congress
meant to address. 60 Part of the original enactment of the FCPA in 1977, the provisions served the
purpose of increasing transparency financial reporting by preventing bribes from being impermissibly
mischaracterized as lawful expenses. 61 A violation of the accounting provisions is separate from a
violation of the anti-bribery provisions and they are “enforced without regard to whether there are
connected allegations of foreign bribery.”62
There are two parts of the FCPA accounting provisions; the Books and Records provision, and
the Internal Controls provision. 63 The Books and Records provision provides that every issuer must
“make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect

56

See United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 745 (5 th Cir. 2004) (“The extent to which the exception for routine
governmental action (‘facilitating payments’ or ‘grease’) is narrowly drawn reasonably suggests that Congress was
carving out very limited categories of permissible payments from an otherwise br oad statutory prohibition.”);
United States v. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d 535, 539 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 21, 2008) (holding that a foreign law statute
relieving the payer of a bribe from criminal responsibility does not make the act lawful because it was unlawful at
the time).
57 FCPA Resource Guide supra note 2, at 38.
58 FCPA Resource Guide supra note 2, at 38.
59 THE FOREIGN CORRUPT P RACTICES A CT: COMPLIANCE, INVESTIGATIONS A ND ENFORCEMENT § 3.01.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 THE FOREIGN CORRUPT P RACTICES A CT: COMPLIANCE, INVESTIGATIONS A ND ENFORCEMENT § 3.01.
63 Id.
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the transactions and dispositions of the [issuer’s] assets[.]”64 The Books and Records provision’s “in
reasonable detail” standard was adopted by congress so that it did not suggest that the records were
required to meet a level of accuracy that is unrealistic. 65 The reasonable detail that is required has been
defined as “the level of detail that ‘would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs.’” 66
However, the agencies have provided very little guidance about the level of detail that is sufficient and
whenever bribery has occurred within a subsidiary, the Books and Records provision are violated as a
result of strict liability. 67
There are three fundamental requirements in order for a company to maintain compliance with the
Books and Records provision. The first is that the books and records must “reflect transactions in
conformity with accepted methods of reporting economic events.” 68 Additionally, a company must not
engage in “misrepresentation, concealment, falsification, circumvention, and other deliberate acts
resulting in inaccurate financial nooks and records.” 69 Lastly, a company is in violation of the Books and
Records provision if transactions are not “properly reflected on books and records in such a manner as
to permit the preparation of financial statements in conformity” with applicable criteria for measuring
the accuracy of these statements. 70 The act does not limit violations of this provision to material
inaccuracies and the SEC has explicitly stated that these provisions are concerned with more than what
is material to investors. 71

64

15 U.S.C. § 78M (b)(2)(a).
FCPA Resource Guide supra note 2, at 39.
66 Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(a)
67 See Mike Koehler, The Facade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L,. 907, 976-80 (2010);
68 THE FOREIGN CORRUPT P RACTICES A CT: COMPLIANCE, INVESTIGATIONS A ND ENFORCEMENT § 3.03.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 SEC Exchange Act Release 34-17500, 1981 LEXIS 2167 at *13 (Jan. 29, 1981).
65
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The Internal Controls provision is meant to “ensure a company’s day-to-day compliance with the
books and records requirements[.]”72 They provide that companies subject the accounting provisions 73
“shall devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable
assurances” of the overall reliability of their disclosures in accordance with SEC rules. 74 This too requires
the internal accounting controls to have a sufficient level of assurance that would “satisfy prudent
officials in the conduct of their own affairs.”75 The Internal Controls provision does not require an issuer
to implement any specific procedure for ensuring compliance and is meant to give these entities
flexibility.76 However, as with the Books and Records provisions, the Internal Controls provisions is
seemingly violated by a parent company whenever they fail to prevent a bribe from being paid by a
majority-owned subsidiary. 77
The statute provides four specific requirements that a system of internal accounting controls
must ensure. First, the provision is violated when the internal controls are not sufficient to “provide
reasonable assurances that transactions are executed in accordance with management’s general or
specific authorization[.]”78 Next, a company’s internal controls must assure that transactions are
recorded as necessary to permit accurate financial reporting and maintain accountability for assets. 79
They must also ensure that access to assets are restricted in accordance with management’s
authorizations and that they are accounted for at reasonable intervals. 80 The prudent official standard

72

THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES A CT: COMPLIANCE, INVESTIGATIONS A ND ENFORCEMENT § 3.04.
The FCPA resource guide provides that the accounting provisions apply to “any issuer whose securities trade
on a national securities exchange in the United States, including foreign issuers with exchange -traded American
Depository Receipts.” FCPA Resource Guide supra note 2, at 43.
74 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2)(b); FCPA Resource Guide supra note 2, at 40.
75 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(7).
76 FCPA Resource Guide supra note 2, at 40.
77 Koehler, supra note 67, at 976-980.
78 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(b)(i).
79 Id. at (b)(ii)
80 Id. at (b)(iii)-(iv).
73
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was meant to add clarity to what constitutes a violation of the accounting provisions but there is little
additional guidance for what is sufficient to avoid liability.81
c. Nature of FCPA Enforcement
The task of enforcing the FCPA is shared between the DOJ and the SEC, along with the assistance of
various other federal agencies. 82 The DOJ has responsibility for criminal enforcement of the Act, in
addition to civil enforcement of the antibribery provisions over domestic concerns and other
businesses.83 The SEC is primarily responsible for civil enforcement for violations of the accounting
provisions by domestic issuers and their agents. 84
The FCPA is seldomly litigated in court and for this reason it is subject to very little judicial scrutiny. 85
Typically, FCPA charges result in settlements between corporations and the SEC and companies have
rarely challenged FCPA charges. 86 In the last three decades, there have been no challenges to FCPA
charges by corporate defendants and these agreements are the “sole means by which corporate FCPA
enforcement actions have been resolved[.]” 87 The information that is released about these settlements
often contain “bare-bones statements of facts replete with legal conclusions.” 88 As a result, the overall
reach and scope of FCPA have been developed informally by the agencies in the form of releases by the
SEC and DOJ following settlement in lieu of an actual enforcement proceeding, in addition to the scant
DOJ and SEC opinion procedure. 89 Companies do not have the incentive to challenge the agencies’
interpretation of the law and rarely make decisions about whether to challenge the enforcement actions
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Koehler, supra note 67, at 976-980.
FCPA Resource Guide supra note 2, at 3.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 4.
85 See Amy Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 497(2011).
86 Koehler, supra note 67, at 929. See also Key Statistics from 1977 to Present, S TANFORD L AW SCHOOL : FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES A CT CLEARINGHOUSE, http://fcpa.stanford.edu/statistics-keys.html (stating that 92% of defendants
to FCPA enforcement actions since 1977 have settled with the SEC).
87 Westbrook, supra note 85, at 497.
88 Id. at 960.
89 Westbrook, supra note 85, at 497.
82
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based on the substantive merit of the charges. 90 Because legal theories that have emerged from the
SEC’s documented enforcement of the Act, such as strict liability, are pursued at the charging stage
which overwhelmingly results in settlements, these theories operate without judicial scrutiny.91
The SEC considers a variety of factors when deciding whether to open an investigation and/or bring
an action against an entity for violating the FCPA. 92 Among others, the SEC takes into account the gravity
of the potential violation, whether it provides the SEC with visibility in a community unfamiliar with the
protections of securities laws, and “whether the case involves a possibly widespread industry practice
that should be addressed.”93 Both the SEC and DOJ take into account any voluntary disclosure of
violations by an entity, co-operation, and remedial efforts in deciding the best course of action. 94
Despite an explicit fining remedy provided for the FCPA, the SEC uses a variety of remedies when
resolving investigations against companies in violation of the Act. 95 One of the primary methods that the
SEC uses to settle violations of the accounting provisions is a Non-prosecution Agreement (“NPA”). 96
These are agreements between the Commission and the company found in violation of the FCPA, that,
among other things, the company will fully comply with any SEC investigation and related enforcement
action and agree to comply with any express undertakings.97 One of these undertakings may be
disgorgement of any profits generated by improper payments. 98 The obvious justification for the
disgorgement remedy is to make sure that those who violate the FCPA do not profit from their acts. 99
Additionally, the SEC’s explicit policy attempts to separate this remedy from its concept of punishment
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Koehler, supra note 67, at 963.
See id.
92 FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 2, at 54.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 55.
95 David Weiss, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Sec Disgorgement Of Profits, And The Evolving International
Bribery Regime: Weighing Proportionality, Retribution, And Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 471, 485 (2009).
96 Koehler, supra note 67, at 928-929.
97 FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 4, at 79.
98 Id. at 71.
99 Id.
91
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for substantive violations of the act and deterrence by stating that “[w]hile the purpose of a penalty or
fine is to punish and deter misconduct, the purpose of forfeiture and disgorgement is primarily to return
the perpetrator to the same position as before the crime[.]” 100 However, in Kokesh v. SEC the Supreme
Court ruled that the SEC disgorgement constituted a ‘penalty’ and rejected the government’s argument
that this remedy was remedial and meant to return the offender to their original position. 101 The Court
reasoned that the remedy does not serve compensatory purposes only and had pecuniary aspects
because in many cases it is not paid to investors as restitution and sometimes exceeds the profits
actually gained from the improper payment. 102
d. scope of liability under the Anti-bribery and Accounting provisions
The anti-bribery provision applies to both domestic concerns and issuers as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 78
(I), (O)(d), and any agent of an issuer who uses an instrumentality of interstate commerce in furtherance
of a bribe.103 Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78 (I), an entity is considered an “Issuer” for the purposes of the
FCPA if its securities are traded on a national exchange. 104 The FCPA anti-bribery provisions cover
“Domestic Concerns” and this includes any entity that’s principal place of business is in the United
States, including sole proprietorships. 105 Additionally, the FCPA applies to entities who are not issuers or
domestic concerns if that entity acts in furtherance of a corrupt payment within the territory of the
United States or by means of interstate commerce. 106
The accounting provisions apply to issuers of securities registered with the SEC in accordance with
Section 12 of the Exchange act and those required to file reports with the SEC pursuant to Section
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Id.
137 S. Ct. 1635, 1643-45 (2017).
102 Id. at 1644. See also id. (“[t]hus, for example, ‘an insider trader may be ordered to disgorge not only the
unlawful gains that accrue to the wrongdoer directly, but also the benefit that accrues to third parties whose g ains
can be attributed to the wrongdoer’s conduct.’” (quoting SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296, 302 (2 nd Cir. 2014)).
103 15 U.S.C. § 78dd 1-2.
104 15 U.S.C § 78 (I) (a).
105 FCPA Resource Guide supra note 2, at 10; 15 U.S.C § 78dd (2).
106 15 U.S.C. § 78 dd (3); FCPA Resource Guide supra note 2, at 10-11.
101
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15(d).107 Generally, any corporation with a stock that is registered with the SEC and also traded on a
national securities change in the United States is within the scope of the accounting provisions. 108
Issuers may also be held directly liable for their subsidiaries’ violations of the accounting provisions,
even if the subsidiary itself is not an ‘issuer’. 109 When a parent company owns greater than 50% of the
voting power in a subsidiary entity, they are held strictly liable for the violations of the accounting
provisions committed by the subsidy. 110 However, if a parent company has a 50% share or less of the
voting interest in the subsidy, they are only required to make reasonable efforts in good faith to use it s
influence to cause the subsidy to comply with the accounting provisions. 111
The SEC has adopted a rigid theory of control liability by applying a good-faith compliance
requirement only if the parent company owns less than 51% of the subsidiary. 112 Under this theory of
liability, a parent company is in violation of the accounting provisions whenever a bribe has been paid
by a subsidiary whose books and records are consolidated with the parent company’s. 113 A public
company must ensure that subsidiaries under its control comply with the FCPA accounting provisions,
even if they would not apply to the subsidiary independently. 114 The SEC has routinely held parent
companies liable for violations of the FCPA accounting provisions based on strict liability for subsidiary’s
violations of the FCPA without any factual allegations that would suggest the parent company
committed a substantive violation. 115 For example, the SEC has found parent companies in violation of
the books and records provision if their consolidated records do not accurately reflect an improper
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payment, despite no evidence of participation, knowledge, or willful blindness on behalf of the parent
company.116 Under the internal controls provision, strict liability has been applied in a similar w ay; a
parent company will generally be held liable under this provision if it fails to prevent a majority-owned
subsidiary from violating the FCPA. 117
III. The SEC Enforcement Action Against Novartis AG and Strict Liability’s Implications on
Compliance in the Context of a Merger
Novartis is a swiss corporation that is publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange
(“NYSE”).118 In 2011, Novartis executed a merger with Alcon Inc., a public company that is also organized
under Swiss law. 119 At the time of the merger, Novartis A.G. acquired 77% of Alcon’s outstanding shares
and Alcon ceased to be listed in the NYSE after Novartis acquired the remaining 23%.

120

After the

transaction was executed, Alcon’s assets, liabilities, and contracts were assumed by Novartis. 121 Despite
the dissolution of Alcon Inc. by law, it remained separate reporting segment within Novartis and
remained much of its independent attributes, evidenced by its return as a publicly listed company in
2018.122
The SEC proceedings against Novartis encompassed a variety of activities conducted by local
subsidiaries in various regions of Europe and Asia. 123 Alcon Pte Ltd., was the Singapore affiliate of Alcon
Inc. and Novartis was held liable for the actions of its Vietnam that were found to be a violation of the
FCPA’s accounting provisions.124 According to the SEC order detailing the violations, the Vietnam branch
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of Alcon Pte Ltd., engaged in a pattern of making improper payments to officials in state -owned
hospitals and clinics. 125 The payments were made through a third-party distributor beginning in 2007
and continued until 2014. 126 From 2008 to 2011, the Vietnam branch classified the payments as a
“consultancy program.”127 After the 2011 merger with Novartis however, the payments were classified
by the Alcon Pte Ltd executives under different labels including “patient education.” 128 The purpose of
the payments were to boost sales of Alcon Inc. surgical equipment and it is alleged that Novartis was
unjustly enriched by $8.4 Million as a result of the improper payments in Vietnam. 129
The SEC did not allege that Novartis had any knowledge of the payments and noted the
measures that were taken by the Vietnam affiliate to conceal their nature from Novartis.130 The only
culpable conduct on the part of Novartis in regard to the violations of the Vietnam subsidiary mentioned
in the order was that they “failed to take sufficient steps to ensure the improper payments to [ health
care officials] halted.”131 The SEC simply claimed that the payments were classified differently after the
Alcon-Novartis merger without pointing to any faulty accounting procedures, inadequate due diligence,
or knowledge on the part of Novartis. 132 The SEC resolution states that executives of Alcon Pte Ltd had
knowledge of the improper payments by at least 2014 when the payments halted. 133 The executives
who were aware of the improper payment scheme submitted certification letters to Alcon’s CEO and
FCO attesting to the accuracy of their financial reporting. 134 In fact, there is no allegation that anyone
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knew of the scheme outside of Alcon Pte Ltd., its Vietnam branch office, and the third-party distributor
that paid the bribes on their behalf. 135
The Novartis enforcement action demonstrates how the failure to account for the distinct
identity of the subsidiary apart from the parent company in its theory of liability is especially
problematic in the context of an acquisition between complex corporations. There are two main reasons
why this theory of liability is problematic. The first is that a parent company that is in the process of
acquiring an entity does not have all the information necessary to take the proper steps to mitigate their
risk for being held liable for FCPA violations. The second reason why strict liability has problematic
implications in this context is that it fails to account for the time it takes to implement compliance
controls within a newly acquired subsidiary post-merger.
Applying strict liability for the parent companies of wholly owned subsidiaries has far-reaching
implications on the task of assessing compliance risk in the pre-merger stage.136 When a parent
company has complete information about a subsidiary of a company they are targeting for acquisition,
multiple steps can be taken to protect themselves from future liability. However, more often is the case
where the entity that is acquiring the subsidiary does not have all the knowledge it needs to protect
itself or make an informed decision about whether the transaction is worth entering given the risk for
potential FCPA violations. 137 In these situations, holding the parent company strictly liable for subsidiary
violations immediately upon execution of the merger is questionable when an entity makes good -faith
efforts to discover such information and otherwise makes good-faith efforts to cause the subsidiary to
comply with its internal controls.
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The lack of information that an acquiring entity has prior to execution of the merger poses a
large issue because the inability to discover a course of bribery impairs a parent company’s ability to
protect themselves from liability. One way that corporations can do this is by placing provisions in a
contractual agreement that shifts liability to third parties for their violations by explicitly preventing
them from violating the FCPA . 138 However, the SEC only takes this into account in cases where the agent
is hired on a service contract and factual circumstances involving a merger can render this impractical or
unreasonable. 139 Additionally, parent corporations can incorporate compliance risk when negotiating
the price for acquiring the offending subsidiary. 140 For example, if, when conducting due diligence, an
acquiring entity discovers a practice of making improper payments to distributors, it can factor this into
the value of the transaction and its cost-benefit analysis for entering into the transaction. However,
when a parent company does not have enough information to discover continuing violations within the
subsidiary that survive the merger, this is not possible. 141 This leaves parent corporations in the position
where the only way they can prevent a possible SEC investigation or enforcement action is to make all
reasonable efforts to discover and address bribery prior to the merger and hope for leniency from the
SEC once it is executed.
In the Novartis action, the improper payments were made entirely within the Vietnam
subsidiary of the newly acquired Alcon division and raises the question of their discoverability.142 The
ability of Novartis to discover these payments was also severely limited by the fact that the Alcon Pte .
Ltd. executives willfully conspired to hide these payments and cause Novartis to violate the accounting
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provisions.143 Additionally, the SEC seemingly acknowledged that Novartis made reasonable efforts to
discover this information prior to the acquisition and disclosed the information as it was discovered. 144 If
Novartis was able to acquire information sufficient to become aware of the scheme and its extent, they
would have been able to accurately evaluate the risk of this conduct causing them to be in violation of
the FCPA.145 While this may be easy and clear cut in many cases, in many others the ambiguity in the
substance and enforcement of the Act’s provisions make this a highly speculative inquiry.146
To discover the scheme of payments and accounting violations within the Alcon Singapore
subsidiary before they acquired Alcon Inc., Novartis would have had to have conducted a level of due
diligence prior to the merger that is seemingly unrealistic. In order to discover the extent of the
improper conduct, Novartis would have needed access to information regarding the relationship
between the third-party distributor, the transaction itself, and how it was recorded. 147 This level of
detailed information is not easily acquired in a transaction as large and complex as this one, with several
levels of subsidiaries in many different countries. 148 Even if robust pre-acquisition due diligence is not
possible, the SEC policy is to take action when the surviving entity failed to prevent improper payments
from occurring.149 When a corporation is in the unfortunate position of discovering a practice of making
unethical payments within a majority-owned subsidiary after a merger has been executed, they have
seemingly already violated the FCPA. Despite having no actual knowledge of conduct or reason to know,
the parent is chargeable for the conduct that occurred within the subsidiary. 150 This remains the policy
of the SEC even if the parent company has seemingly made all reasonable efforts to detect and prevent
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the conduct pre- and post-merger if it owns a majority of the subsidiary’s shares. 151 This is seemingly the
situation that Novartis found itself in being held liable for the conduct of the Vietnam branch of Alcon
Pte. Ltd.152 While this arguably does not account for the concept of culpability, defendants have little
incentive to challenge the agencies’ interpretation of the act and this theory of liability remains
unchallenged. 153
Strict liability is also problematic in the context of an acquisition because it fails to account for
the process of implementing internal controls within a newly acquired subsidiary. After a merger has
been executed, a company that was unable to discover a scheme of bribery and accounting violations
before the merger cannot escape liability for the violation despite making reasonable and good -faith
efforts to put an end to it. 154 Unless they can completely put an end to all bribes and accounting
violations within the subsidiary at the time the merger is executed, their only recourse is to disclose the
newly discovered information to the SEC and hope for leniency. 155 To prevent bribes from occurring at
this stage, a corporation’s compliance program must be in place and successful. The effectiveness of
compliance programs is reduced drastically when operating in emerging markets and in the initial stages
of implementing controls within a newly acquired subsidiary. 156 The ability of a corporation’s compliance
program to prevent bribery largely depends on the strength of the firm-wide internal controls. 157
While many factors have an impact on this issue, the culture of a corporation has a large impact
on their effectiveness in preventing bribery and other criminal acts that could implicate a corporation.158
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Corporate culture is generally the system of norms and values that permeate throughout an
organization.159 It also includes the management style and incentive structure. 160 When one large
corporation acquires another, and the two have distinct identities, the culture of the acquired entity
does not change immediately. 161 There can be significant impediments to effective integration and
change must be implemented methodically. 162
The underlying reasoning for the distinction between liability for majority- and minority-owned
subsidies is the presumption that a company owning a controlling interest of a subsidiary can ensure
subsidiary compliance with the parent company’s internal controls. 163 However, the SEC’s reliance on
this assumption as the basis of strict liability does not accommodate for the time it takes after the
merger to change subsidiary’s potentially engrained corporate culture. 164 While the SEC policy can be
presumed to incentivize parent companies to continuously evaluate and improve their compliance
programs, even a slight possibility of an SEC investigation for FCPA violations can have a chilling effect
on transactions. This discourages companies from actually making the acquisition and undertaking the
process of making the subsidiary more ethical when preventing violations immediately after the merger
is executed is an impossible task. 165
The application of the good-faith standard r is based on the perceived lack of control that
minority owners have over subsidiaries. 166 The SEC’s enforcement of strict liability for post-merger
violations is especially objectionable because it ignores the practicalities of executing and implementing
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a merger that are acknowledged by the agency itself. 167 The evolution of the parent-subsidiary
relationship in the course of a merger is acknowledged by the agencies in the FCPA resource guide. 168
The SEC and DOJ explicitly recognize that “robust pre-acquisition due diligence may not be possible.” 169
Additionally, the agencies’ statements also seem to reflect the premise that internal controls and
compliance programs take at least some time to integrate. 170 This is implied in the enforcement policy of
the SEC, which recognizes that adequacy of the integration efforts is a circumstantial inquiry and
requires corporations to integrate internal controls as quickly as possible. 171 However, when the
defendant corporation is charged with an FCPA accounting violation as a result of a wholly owned
subsidiary’s conduct, the fact that the later was recently acquired and the integration process was still
being undertaken when the conduct occurred is irrelevant to whether they committed a violation. 172
While this is problematic those tasked with figuring out the chance of facing SEC action N ovartis’
liability for the conduct of Alcon Pte. Ltd. may be explained on a theory of unjust enrichment because
the remedy consisted of disgorgement to the SEC in the amount of $8.4 million. 173 The DOJ alleged that
Alcon Pte. Ltd. was also unjustly enriched by the scheme by a strikingly similar amount of $8.5 million. 174
This can be explained by how the profits from Alcon Pte. Ltd. were shared between the various branches
and subsidiaries of Alcon Inc. and Novartis, but whether and to what extent profits were shared should
not constitute the sole basis of finding that Novartis is guilty for violating the FCPA. The SEC
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disgorgement remedy is based on equity, but its stated policy explicitly limits this remedy to punishing
those who have committed FCPA violations.175
Because a corporation can only be subject to disgorgement if they were enriched as a result of
their conduct found in violation of the FCPA, the fact that Novartis was ‘unjustly enriched’ by the Alcon
Pte. Ltd. conspiracy is essentially irrelevant to whether they should be subject to disgorgement.176
Therefore, by agreeing to the SEC’s Cease-and-Desist order, Novartis explicitly sanctioned the SEC’s
finding that they substantively violated the FCPA accounting provisions. 177 While Novartis is certainly not
entitled to keep any improperly obtained profits, nothing in the SEC order referred to any improper
action on the part of Novartis that would justify a substantive violation meriting a disgorgement remedy
aside from failing to prevent the improper payments and subsequent cover-up within the Alcon
subsidiary.178 Additionally, the SEC could not argue that the disgorgement in this case was not a penalty
because it was to be paid to the general fund of the Treasury as opposed to any victim. 179 In these,
situations where a parent company has received profits as a result of FCPA violations committed entirely
within a newly acquired subsidiary, the parent company should have a way of disgorging these profits
without the resulting reputational harm associated with a substantive violation based on strict liability.
This application of strict liability based on voting power is certainly questionable but is arguably
a question of policy preference. However, by requiring an acquiring entity to discover and stop a pattern
of improper payments and accounting at the time of execution, regulators effectively mandate an
inquiry equivalent to an internal investigation based solely on disclosures made by an interested
party.180 A clear message that has been sent to compliance professionals is that unless they can be sure
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that all bribes and accounting violations in a target entity’s majority-owned subsidiaries can be
prevented immediately following the execution of a merger, they will be held liable. 181 Without any
allegation that Novartis failed to make reasonable efforts while conducting due diligence and post merger implementation, compliance professionals are left to assume that this is exactly what the SEC
intends.
IV. The Novartis Action illustrates a scenario in which the SEC should replace strict liability
with a requirement to make good-faith efforts to encourage compliance with the FCPA
The SEC’s policy of applying strict liability to parent companies under the accounting provisions
should be modified to account for the practical difficulties of ensuring FCPA compliance throughout the
execution and implementation of a merger. Alcon Pte Ltd was an entirely foreign subsidiary of a large
public company that Novartis had acquired in the midst of a continuing scheme of making and covering
up illegal bribes.182 Additionally, the payments were being made through a third-party agent of that
subsidiary and were concealed through mischaracterizations within that subsidiary’s books. 183 However,
because Novartis did not immediately put an end to the scheme that had been in place for four years, all
efforts that were made by Novartis to do so were nullified by actors that intentionally caused this result.
Devoting resources to due-diligence and post-merger implementation of effective compliance programs
makes little sense for an entity if it does not have any impact on whether they will be held liable for acts
they did not, and could not have found out about until it was too late .184The SEC should hold parent
companies of recently-acquired, majority-owned subsidiaries to the same good-faith standard it holds
parent companies of minority-owned subsidiaries to generally because it would incentivize companies
to devote additional resources to FCPA compliance. A good-faith standard would accomplish this by
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rewarding the efforts of parent companies to acquire a company and make its subsidiaries more ethical
by discovering and addressing bribery.185
Holding parent companies of majority-owned subsidiaries liable under a good-faith standard will
have a positive impact on deterrence because the SEC will examine compliance efforts when making the
decision whether to take action against domestic issuers. Ultimately, we do not know if Novartis made
good-faith and reasonable efforts to discover and put an end to this scheme but what we do know is
that they would still be liable for violating the FCPA even if they had. The natural implication is that
unless the compliance program is sufficiently planned and implemented to stop the acts of newly
acquired subsidiaries that violate the accounting provisions, they face the risk of liability for FCPA
violations. Knowing that even the best compliance programs cannot prevent rogue employees of a
subsidiary separated by multiple tiers from the parent company, executives therefore have little
incentive to devote additional resources to ensuring that a compliance program is completely effective
when the merger is executed.186
The reason for the SEC’s policy of strict liability is that it will encourage parent companies to use
their control of the majority-owned subsidiary to cause it to comply with the FCPA’s accounting
provisions.187 However, this ability is inherently compromised during the process of executing and
implementing an acquisition due to the lack of information prior to the merger and the nature of an
engrained corporate culture. For this reason, rewarding good-faith efforts to discover ongoing violations
and implement an effective compliance program within the subsidiary would encourage compliance
with the FCPA. Only bringing actions against companies that fail to make these efforts will have a

185

Id. at 514-15.
See Salbu, supra note 153, at 510 (inducement to make substantial investment in compliance programs is
weak in the absence of a good-faith compliance defense). Irina Sivachenko, Note, Corporate Victims of “Victimless
Crime”: How the FCPA’s Statutory Ambiguity, Coupled with Strict Liability, Hurts Businesses and Discourages
Compliance, 54 B.C. L. REV. 393, 430-31 (2013).
187 FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 2, at 44.
186

26

positive effect on deterrence because avoiding the reputational harm associated with a civil
disgorgement action provides executives with an incentive to give compliance efforts a bigger role at
each step of an acquisition. 188 Under the SEC”s current policy of holding companies in this situation
liable under strict liability, good-faith efforts by compliance professionals are made in vain when ,
unbeknownst to anyone within the parent company, an employee newly-acquired subsidiary makes an
improper payment and mischaracterizes its nature within the books of that subsidiary. 189
Under a good-faith standard, the parent company of a minority-owned subsidiary will only be
liable for the actions of that subsidiary in violation of the FCPA if they fail to make a reasonable effort in
good faith to cause that subsidiary to maintain adequate internal controls and accurate books and
records.190 Applying a good faith standard for evaluating the liability for parent companies that have
recently acquired wholly or majority-owned subsidiaries would encourage compliance efforts for the
same reasons it does for minority-owned subsidiaries. The reason for the application of such a standard
to parents of minority owned subsidiaries is that they “may not be able to exercise the same level of
control over minority-owned subsidiar[ies].”191 This reasoning also applies to majority-owned entities
whose parent companies have been recently acquired by another entity, but continue to have an
entrenched identity and internal culture immediately following execution of the acquisition.192
By allowing parent companies of wholly- or majority-owned subsidiaries to allege that they
made good-faith efforts to cause the newly acquired subsidiary to comply with the accounting
provisions in lieu of strict liability for conduct that occurred during the post-merger stage, the
practicalities of executing a merger would be accounted for in the way that the Act is enforced.
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Additionally, the parent company will be shielded from any liability resulting from conduct that they
could not have discovered before executing the transaction. This allows entities to do the work it will
take to foster a culture of ethical payments and accurate reporting within newly-acquired entities with
poor internal controls. However, the applicable scope of this standard should be limited to an
acceptable period after the acquisition has been executed. The policy of holding companies strictly liable
should become apply after a reasonable amount time has passed for the parent company to discover
problems and implement effective internal controls. This will give parent companies a grace period to do
the work it takes to fully assess the compliance issues within the subsidiaries and potential solutions
after the acquisition is completed.
The framework for this standard must account for the chief objections to diverting from strict
liability under the accounting provisions. These are that strict liability is more efficient, a good-faith
compliance standard would turn litigation into a “battle of experts” and that it would encourage
corporations to create extensive programs on paper that are disingenuous in practice.193 In order to
satisfy this standard, a parent company would have to show that ongoing violations that were
discovered post-acquisition were not reasonably discoverable prior to execution. This would require a
showing that the parent conducted adequate and sufficient due-diligence to discover the violation
before the acquisition such that if the ongoing violations were reasonably discoverable prior to
execution, the parent company would have discovered them. Additionally, if the entity did discover
violations prior to acquisition, in order to meet the good-faith standard a parent company would have to
show that they had a reasonable plan to implement sufficient internal controls within a reasonable time.
Companies should bear the burden of showing that they made reasonable, good-faith efforts to achieve
compliance at all stages and that these efforts failed through no fault of their own. These limitations
would account for the concerns of the enforcement agencies while also rewarding good-faith actors
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who are unjustly held liable for the acts of their subsidiaries. 194 Lastly, although parent companies would
be able to escape liability for substantive violations by making good-faith efforts to cause the subsidiary
to comply with the FCPA, there must be a way in which they can return any profits they received as a
result of any improper payments without the stain of an SEC order.
V. Conclusion
The SEC action against Novartis illustrates the broad implications strict liability for majorityowned subsidiary violations of the FCPA accounting provisions has for parent companies that have
recently acquired multi-tiered corporations. 195 This incentivizes companies that make acquisitions of
other entities to take large risks of incurring regulatory violations or avoid the market altogether by
giving them the ultimatum; they must either prevent newly acquired subsidiaries from violating its
provisions after acquisition has been executed, or refrain from executing the transaction. 196 By failing to
account for the process of identifying needed improvements within the subsidiary and implementing
solutions that occurs long after the merger is executed, the SEC’s current theory of liability does not give
any leniency to companies acting in good-faith. The realities of changing an engrained corporate culture
and the lack of adequate information prior to the merger should be reflected in the theory of liability
that is applied to parent companies for violations that continue throughout the transaction and after its
completion. This can be done effectively by subjecting parent companies in the post-merger stage to a
good-faith standard that shields them from liability for subsidiary violations of the accounting provisions
when they make good-faith efforts to cause the subsidiary to comply at all stages of the merger. Such a
standard would have a positive effect on deterrence by rewarding compliance efforts with the
recognition that even the best programs will not be completely effective every time .
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